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Revenue Impacts of MPP Branded
Funds: A Firm-Level Analysis
Paul M. Jakus, Kimberly L. Jensen, and George C. Davis
The USDA’s Market Access Program (formerly Market Promotion Program) recently underwent a
major change to redirect all branded products export promotion funds to small domestic firms and
cooperatives. The redirection responded to criticisms by the General Accounting Office of past
allocations of branded products export promotion funds to large, experienced exporters. This study
uses a firm-level analysis to examine whether firm size and export experience matter in how
effectively firms use the promotion funds to increase their revenues. The results support neither the
GAO criticisms nor the recent program redirection.
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One of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
(USDA’s) most visible export promotion programs
is the Market Access Program (MAP), formerly
known as the Market Promotion Program (MPP).
The MAP uses funds from the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) to assist U.S. firms by cost-
sharing promotional activities abroad for U.S. agri-
cultural products. An overall objective of the MPP/
MAP program throughout its history has been to in-
crease export sales. Another objective of the MPP/
MAP has been to give special priority to firms that
face undue trade barriers for their products, neces-
sitating more intense promotional efforts.
In 1998, Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman an-
nounced that all MAP funds for export promotion
of branded products would be allocated to coopera-
tives and small domestic companies (USDA, 1998).
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1 Secretary Glickman stated, “For the first time ... all MAP funds for
promotion of branded products will be allocated to cooperatives and small
U.S. companies to help them expand their sales in the international
market place” [emphasis added].
The MAP is now exclusively targeted at small
firms, firms relatively new to exporting, and firms
facing consumer awareness and import restriction
problems in foreign markets. The redirection of
MAP funds exclusively to small domestic firms and
cooperatives represents a major departure from the
priorities originally set out for the program.
The program funds redirection was, in part, a
response to criticisms of the program by the U.S.
Congress and the General Accounting Office (GAO)
throughout the 1990s (U.S. GAO 1993a,b, 1995,
1997, 1998, 1999). GAO reports alleged that MPP
funds have not been targeted at firms most in need
of export assistance. Because small and/or “new-to-
export” firms may have more difficulty accessing
international markets than larger or more export-
experienced firms, the GAO has argued that smaller
and less export-experienced firms should receive
the greatest share of MPP/MAP funds.
Closely related to this “equity” criticism is an
“efficiency” criticism. The GAO contended large
firms would simply substitute CCC-provided MPP
funds for private promotional expenditures, thus re-
sulting in a negligible impact on large firms’ export
sales. MPP funding allocated to small firms and/or
“new-to-export” firms would result in greater export
sales per dollar funding than would allocations to
larger, more experienced firms.
Response to these criticisms began with the Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, placing
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greater program emphasis on providing MPP/MAP
funds to small firms facing exporting problems.
2
The response culminated in 1998, with the total re-
direction of program funds under Secretary Glick-
man’s administration.
The program redirection was initiated despite the
absence of strong empirical evidence that smaller,
less export-experienced firms are more effective
than larger, more experienced firms in converting
MPP/ MAP funds into export sales. While several
studies have considered the overall effectiveness of
the Market Promotion Program by analyzing aggre-
gate market data, none of these studies have directly
addressed these GAO criticisms.
3 In fact, aggregate
market data cannot be used to answer this question.
Analysis to support or refute the Congressional/
GAO criticisms and the ensuing program redirec-
tion can be empirically addressed only if firm-level
data are used.
This analysis attempts to answer the question
central to the GAO’s criticisms and the program re-
direction: whether firm size and export experience
matter in the conversion of MPP/MAP branded
funds into firm sales. The study provides the first
firm-level analysis of the impacts of MPP/MAP
branded funds on firm sales. The empirical results
are then directly linked to the GAO criticisms
regarding firm size and export experience using
estimates of marginal revenue and average revenue
resulting from MPP funds.
This study also makes a methodological contri-
bution by developing an econometric model that
integrates two different approaches to estimate the
revenues added by MPP/MAP funds. Integrating
these approaches within the same econometric
model produces qualitatively identical results,
yet also yields more efficient parameter estimates.
The modeling procedure should prove useful
when designing similar surveys and analyzing the
responses.
An Initial Model Relating Export Sales 
to MPP Funding
In this section we develop a reduced-form model of
export sales as a function of MPP expenditures and
other factors. The motivation for working with the re-
duced form is that the MPP program has a matching-
funds requirement, and MPP funds will likely also
influence nonsubsidized promotion expenditures.
Specifically, let export sales (ES) be written as a
function of total promotion expenditures (TPE) and
a vector of other variables X1, or ES = f(TPE, X1).
Now TPE can be considered the sum of MPP funds,
matching funds (MF), and nonsubsidized promotion
expenditures (NPE). However, by definition, the
level of matching funds depends on the MPP allo-
cation, so MF = g(MPP), and the level of NPE will
depend on MPP funds, in addition to other varia-
bles X2, or NPE = h(MPP, X2). Substitution leads
to the general reduced form ES = f(MPP, X1, X2).
The reduced form will therefore capture the total
effect of MPP, or:













where the first term is the partial effect, and the
second and third terms are indirect effects.
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For estimation, an ordinary least squares (OLS)
model could be written as:
ES ' Xβ % Zγ % g,
where X is a vector of factors influencing export
total sales, and Z is a vector of all MPP variables
(e.g., linear, quadratic, or interaction variables)
which influence export sales. Having obtained OLS
estimates of β and γ, one could then estimate the
marginal impact of the MPP funding by simply
taking the derivative of the export sales model with
respect to the Z variables associated with the MPP
funding, MES/MZ = g(γ, Z). The notation reflects the
fact that the marginal effect may be a function of Z
and γ.
2  Most of this legislation is found in the Omnibus Budget and Recon-
ciliation Act of 1993, the FAIR Act of 1996, the Agricultural, Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and related Agencies
Appropriation Act of 1996, and the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993.
3  Examples of this literature include Halliburton and Henneberry
(1995); Weiss, Green, and Havenner (1996); Kinnucan and Christian
(1997); Richards, Van Ispelen, and Kagan (1997); and Richards and
Patterson (1997). Each of the studies provides important information
regarding the aggregate market impacts by examining industry returns
and/or spillover effects from export promotion. The market-level data
used by these researchers permits evaluation of the MPP/MAP program
only in the aggregate, and GAO concerns are not directly addressed.
4  We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this interpretation
of the model. It should also be pointed out that the reduced-form model
is the relevant model for policy considerations because the reduced form
accounts for all feedback effects or multiplier effects. This is for the same
reason that multipliers are so important in macroeconomics and input-
output models; they measure total impacts. There is also a close connec-
tion between this approach and the approaches pursued by Thurman and
Wohlgenant (1989), and Smith (1993) in estimating general equilibrium
demand curves, which are partial reduced forms.186   October 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
The OLS approach, however, ignores the prac-
tical difficulties involved with collecting primary
data at the firm level. Survey practitioners have
long noted the reluctance of households to reveal
their income to interviewers (Dillman, 1978, pp.
105S106). To minimize item nonresponse to a ques-
tion about income, income data are often collected
for intervals (e.g., $0S$9,999, $10,000S$20,000,
etc.), where the respondent is asked to indicate the
interval into which household income falls.
Similarly, firms—particularly those whose shares
are not publicly traded—may be reluctant to reveal
total sales information. Thus, one might wish to
collect such data using the interval format. This pro-
cedure presents only a minor complication for the
econometric model because one may use a “com-
pletely censored” or “grouped data” approach to
modeling these data (see Stewart, 1983; or Greene,
2000). The model is similar to a tobit model, except
the data are censored from below and above, i.e., by
the limits which define each sales interval. A maxi-
mum-likelihood approach estimates the probability
that a firm with characteristics (X, Z) would have
sales within any given sales interval.
The parameters obtained from this model could
be used to calculate export sales according to:
(2) ES ' Xβ % Zγ % σλ(MPP),
where β and γ are estimated coefficients, σ is the
estimated standard deviation of sales, and λ is an
adjustment factor (similar to an inverse Mill’s ratio)
accounting for lower and upper censoring inherent
in the interval data.
5 The variable λ is a function of
all variables and estimated coefficients, but the
above notation makes explicit its functional depen-
dence on the MPP funding. The marginal impact of
MPP funding on firm sales can be estimated by
taking the derivative of this function with respect to
Z, including the λ term.
Survey Design and Data, Part 1
Participants in the 1994 MPP program were sur-
veyed for this study. This year was selected because
the GAO’s criticisms of the program funds
allocation were presented in 1993, and the Budget
Reconciliation Act and related legislation were
passed in 1993. USDA/Foreign Agricultural Service
(FAS) records were used to compile a mailing list
of the population of 764 U.S. firms that participated
in the MPP 1994 program year (branded portion).
During the year in which this study was conducted,
the export promotion program was still called the
Market Promotion Program, so henceforth we refer
to the MPP exclusively.
With the exception of focus group participants
and a pre-test sample of 25 firms, the survey was
mailed to all firms participating in the branded MPP
program in 1994, following a modified Dillman ap-
proach. These firms included those applying through
trade associations, such as the Western United
States Agricultural Trade Association (WUSATA).
6
Approximately one week after the initial mailing, a
follow-up postcard was sent to nonrespondents and
about two weeks later, a second mailing was sent to
all remaining nonrespondents. In conjunction with
the second mailing, reminder phone calls were
placed to nonrespondents. Of the 225 firms respond-
ing to the survey (representing a 31% response rate),
150 provided usable responses to all survey ques-
tions needed for this analysis.
Several questions elicited the information needed
to estimate the impact of firm-level MPP funding
on firm-level export sales according to the econo-
metric specification outlined in equation (1).  Firms
were asked the interval into which their total sales
fell in 1994 (e.g., between $0 and $100,000, between
$100,000 and $249,000, etc.). The total sales ques-
tion was expressed as an interval question because
of the proprietary nature of sales figures for many
firms. The actual level of MPP funds received by
each firm was available from FAS records. The sur-
vey also requested information about firm character-
istics important to answering the GAO criticisms,
such as firm size (number of employees) and export
experience (number of years exporting).
Estimating the Initial Total Sales Model
Relating Total Sales to Export Sales
A key requirement of completely censored models
is that the “limits” used in eliciting the data must be
used in the empirical estimation. Thus, we must use
5  For this model, the inverse Mill’s type correction factor takes the fol-
lowing form:
φ | L & Xβ & Zγ
σ
& φ | U & Xβ & Zγ
σ
÷
Φ U & Xβ & Zγ
σ
& Φ L & Xβ & Zγ
σ
,
where U and L represent the upper and lower truncation limits, respec-
tively, and are the normal density and cumulative distribution φ | and Φ
functions, respectively.
6  We assume trade associations act as simple “pass-through” organiza-
tions having no impact on the ability of firms to convert MPP dollars into
export sales.Jakus, Jensen, and Davis Revenue Impacts of Export Promotion   187
Table 1.  Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics (N = 150)
Variable Name Definition                             Units
 Percent
 or Mean
TS Interval measure of total sales in $10,000s,
percent of sample in category
1 if TS = 10
2 if 10 $ TS # 24.9
3 if 25 $ TS # 49.9
4 if 50 $ TS # 99.9
5 if 100 $ TS # 199.9
6 if 200 $ TS # 499.9
7 if 500 $ TS # 999.9
8 if 1,000 $ TS # 4,999.9
9 if 5,000 $ TS # 9,999.9











e Share of total sales from exports Share (.01 to 1) 0.327
k Proportion by which exports would have changed
if firm had not received MPP funds
Proportion (!4 to +4) !0.119
MPP Funds Value of 1994 program year MPP allocation from
FAS, in $10,000s
Dollars/10,000 4.269
Small Firm Fewer than 500 employees 1 if fewer than 500 employees,
0 otherwise
0.847
New to Export Exporting 5 years or less 1 if exporting 5 years or less,
0 otherwise
0.433
Years in Business Years in business Years/10 3.249
Employees Number of full-time employees, in 100s Employees/100 3.408
the limits from the question about “total sales”
because export sales were not elicited in the interval
approach. This does not present a major complica-
tion, however, because MPP funds are restricted to
use on export activities. Noting that total sales (TS)
is the sum of domestic sales (DS) and export sales
(ES), then TS = DS + ES(Z), or
TS ' DS % Xβ % Zγ % σλ(MPP).
If there are no production constraints relating
export sales to domestic sales, DS is independent of
Z, and the impact of MPP funding on export sales
can be estimated using a model based on total sales.
Specification Issues
The goal of the empirical model is to estimate the
impact of MPP funding on firm sales, but—as is the
rule rather than the exception—the exact specifica-
tion is unknown. With respect to explanatory
variables, the controversy surrounding the MPP
program suggested that important variables would
be a direct measure of the MPP funds received by
the firm: firm size and “newness to exporting.” The
level of MPP funding was clearly part of the Z
vector, as were variables which interact MPP funds
with the firm size and “newness-to-export” vari-
ables. The interaction terms allow the model to
disentangle the effects of MPP funding by key firm
characteristics.
Empirically, firm size was measured two ways:
with a dummy variable, and by directly including
the number of employees. The dummy variable
Small Firm represents the size cutoff (less than 500
employees) for Small Business Assistance for most
firms in the eligible industries. New to Export de-
notes firms that had exported for five years or less.
Another factor expected to influence firm sales was
business experience, so a measure of experience
was also included (Years in Business). Business
experience, firm size, and newness to export were
hypothesized to influence firm sales regardless of
the level of MPP funding (these variables formed
the core of the X vector). Summary statistics for
these data are provided in table 1.
With respect to functional form issues, models
that were both linear and nonlinear in variables were
estimated. Nonlinearity of a quadratic form was
introduced by using the square root of the contin-
uous right-hand-side variables.
7
7  This form was used as a simple way to allow for nonlinear MPP
effects. Alternatively, one could use a squared term or take the natural
log, but economic theory provides no guidance on the exact specification.
It is, ultimately, an empirical question. For example, similar to the usual
quadratic relationship given by the presence of a squared term, a positive
(negative) coefficient on the linear term and a negative (positive) sign on
the square root term yields a U-shaped (inverted U-shaped) function.188   October 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Total Sales Model Results
The initial total sales models represent a simple
grouped data regression of the MPP funds (and other
variables) on total sales. Unlike an OLS approach,
the coefficients from such a model do not have a
simple interpretation (Greene, 2000). The marginal
effect on total sales for a change in, say, the X var-




' β % β
αLφ | L& αUφ | U
σ ΦU& ΦL
& λ2 ,
where the elements of the bracketed term are defined
in the appendix. The derivative with respect to the
Z variables would have a similar form. The impor-
tant point is that the bracketed term is a nonlinear
function of all the parameters and the levels of all
variables in the model. Thus, one must calculate the
marginal effect for each firm evaluated at firm-
specific levels of (X, Z); one cannot simply use the
sign of a given coefficient to draw conclusions re-
garding the marginal impact. In reporting the results
of the total sales model, we simply comment on the
sign and statistical significance of each coefficient
and refrain from discussing marginal effects until a
later section.
The four models reported in table 2 differed with
respect to explanatory variables and functional form.
The final three models (Models 2S4) were restricted
versions of the Model 1 specification reported in the
first column. In all models, the Z vector was com-
posed of MPP Funds, the square root of MPP Funds,
and the interactions between the funding level and
a firm size dummy variable (MPP Funds × Small
Firm), and the funding level and New to Export
(MPP Funds × New to Export).
In Model 1, Small Firm and New to Export were
in the X vector, along with linear and square root
terms for Years in Business and Employees. All X
vector variables were statistically significant except
the nonlinear term for business experience and the
dummy variable New to Export. The Z vector was
composed of linear and square root terms for MPP
Funds, and two terms that interact MPP Funds with
Small Firm and New to Export. Two of these terms
were statistically significant: MPP Funds and the
interaction between MPP Funds and Small Firm.
The second specification (Model 2) kept the X
vector in its most simple form: a linear term for
years in business and dummy variables for firm size
(Small Firm) and exporting experience of five years
or less (New to Export). Several variables were sig-
nificant in Model 2: Years in Business, Small Firm,
MPP Funds, and the interaction term between MPP
Funds and Small Firm were all significant at con-
ventional levels (P-values of less than 0.10). The
estimate of the standard deviation of firm sales,
Sigma(Total Sales), was also significant.
Model 3 used a continuous measure of firm size
(the number of employees divided by 100) in the X
vector. Both linear and quadratic terms for employ-
ment were used, each of which was statistically
significant in explaining firm sales. Years in Busi-
ness and the interaction between MPP Funds and
Small Firm were also significant. Model 4 intro-
duced nonlinearity in Years in Business, with the
remainder of the specification identical to Model 3.
The new nonlinear term was insignificant, and had
little effect on the coefficients and standard errors
of the remaining variables, with the exception of
the linear term for Years in Business.
The grouped data models were encouraging from
the perspective of explaining the impact of MPP
Funds on firm sales. In all models, the interaction
term between the MPP funding level and firm size
was statistically significant, whereas the linear term
for MPP Funds was significant in only two specifi-
cations. These statistically significant coefficients
represent only six of the 16 MPP parameters, how-
ever. Additional information provided by firms on
the impact of MPP on firm sales could improve the
statistical analysis.
Survey Design and Data, Part 2
In addition to the “total sales” approach described
above, another method to evaluate the impact of
MPP funding on export sales was simply to ask firm
managers a direct question:
In 1994, the value of my firm’s export sales
WITHOUT MPP funds would have been: (a) less
by [ $$ ] percent, (b) about the same, (c) greater by
[ $$ ] percent, or (d) zero (no export sales).
In addition, an anonymous referee suggested the model should allow for
different destination or country effects. Though certainly legitimate, we
did not pursue that approach because the interest here is in aggregate
effects, or effects across countries. If country effects are included in the
model but the interest is in the effects across all countries (the aggregate
effects), then the effects across all countries would have to be aggregated
in some fashion. It is not clear how this should be done, because by defin-
ition the regression equation that includes country effects is conditional
on those country effects. The heart of the issue is an old one: In estimat-
ing an aggregate relationship, is it better to estimate and then aggregate?
or aggregate and then estimate? There does not appear to be any clear-cut
answer in the literature (e.g., see Grunfield and Griliches, 1960), but here
we aggregate and then estimate.Jakus, Jensen, and Davis Revenue Impacts of Export Promotion   189
Table 2.  Grouped Data Models























































































Log Likelihood !390.066 !412.521 !393.145 !391.813
Notes: * and ** denote statistical significance at α = 0.10 and 0.05, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
This type of question is of a “contingent” nature;
that is, “contingent on your firm not receiving MPP
funding, what would your export sales have been?”
In the parlance of the literature, the survey elicited
a “contingent response.” Such questions have been
used by economists for over 30 years, generally to
analyze markets for new products, transportation
alternatives, or to value nonmarket (environmental)
commodities. In recent years, a burgeoning literature
has linked contingent response data to “traditional”
data associated with observable responses. While
the majority of such studies have focused on envi-
ronmental goods or new products, recent studies
have extended the analysis to farmer adoption of best
management agricultural practices (Cooper, 1997)
and adoption of new agricultural technologies (Hub-
bell, Marra, and Carlson, 2000).
8
Opponents of a contingent response approach
often argue that answers to these types of questions
are, at best, uninformative (high variance) or, at
worst, biased. Such concerns can be well-founded
for a number of different reasons. Those most ger-
mane to this application include scenarios where:
(a) respondents must evaluate an unfamiliar product
or situation, i.e., the MPP program; (b) responses
do not reflect economic constraints, i.e., the cost to
producers, in terms of matching funds and complet-
ing program paperwork; and (c) there is an incentive
to provide a strategic response. Each of these issues
is addressed below in turn.
First, the questionnaire was sent only to firms
who had received MPP funding, and was completed
by managers who were responsible for administering
8  In addition to the papers described in the text, the applications in
which the different types of data are combined are growing rapidly. A
small selection of recent research would include Haener, Boxall, and
Adamowicz (2001) for an application to recreational site choice; Earnhart
(2001) for residential amenities; and Brownstone, Bunch, and Train
(2000) for the demand for alternative fuel vehicles. For a thorough review
of the econometric advantages and complications associated with combin-
ing data, see Hensher, Louviere, and Swait (1999).190   October 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
the MPP funds. Thus, respondents were very
familiar with the MPP program and its effects. With
respect to the second concern, the focus group work
and questions on the survey indicated respondents
were keenly aware of the constraints imposed by
program participation. For example, 31.2% reported
that the matching funds requirement made compli-
ance for reimbursement difficult, while nearly 66%
said the paperwork and procedures required for
compliance were difficult. Some 55% of respond-
ents agreed or strongly agreed with the following
statement: “Overall, complying with the program
requirements to receive reimbursement was dif-
ficult.” These results suggest responses to the
contingent response question were made with full
knowledge of the constraints imposed by program
participation.
Finally, we must deal with the incentive for stra-
tegic response, i.e., will respondents systematically
bias their answers regarding the effect of MPP
funding on firm sales? First, MPP funding was not
allocated on the basis of self-reports of past export
performance of MPP funds. Rather, firms were asked
to provide information about promotional budgets
(including MPP funding) in the previous two years.
Further, the vast bulk of the eight-page application
form gathered information about the proposed
marketing plan under which the requested MPP
funds would be used. At no point does the applica-
tion request information regarding the effectiveness
of promotion funds a firm may have received in the
past.
9
Second, 42% of responding firms reported export
sales would not fall (or would have increased) if
MPP funds were not available. It is difficult to see
how these results suggest a systematic bias in one
direction or the other. Even if bias were present,
however, it is likely to be relatively small, and could
be adjusted by combining different sources of data
and imposing parameter restrictions, as described in
the next section.
Linking the Additional Information to
the Total Sales Model
Firms’ contingent response to loss of MPP funding
could be used to calculate a second estimate of the
impact of MPP funds on revenues. However, the
contingent response approach can be linked to the
total sales model so that joint estimation of the two
models will yield a single, more efficient estimate
of the impact of MPP funding on firm sales.
Specifically, whereas the total sales model relates
total sales to total MPP funding, the contingent
response model relates changes in sales to changes
in MPP funding. The links between the two models
can be exploited to gain efficiency in estimation.
The approach is similar in spirit to estimating a cost
function and factor demand functions simul-
taneously, where the first derivative or change of
the cost function yields the factor demands via
Shephard’s lemma. Similarly, joint estimation of two
different models is increasingly common in the
economics literature, where the theoretical links
underlying the two approaches are exploited in the
estimation process.
The goal is to connect the total sales model to the
contingent response model, where the contingent
response, k, measures the proportional change in
firm-level export sales due to loss of MPP funds.
First, note that total sales without MPP can be writ-
ten as TS(No MPP) = Xβ + σλ(No MPP). The total
impact of MPP can then be derived from the grouped
data model of equation (1) using the relation:
(3)   ∆TS ' TS(MPP) & TS(No MPP),
where the censoring adjustment λ(·) in the “No
MPP” case is evaluated with Z = 0. By definition,
total sales is equal to domestic sales plus export
sales (i.e., TS=DS+ES). Again, by law, MPP funds
cannot be used on domestic sales. Thus, if there are
no production constraints relating domestic and ex-
port sales, then




Also, by definition, export sales are equal to the
proportion of total sales from exports (e) times total
sales, or ES(MPP) = e×TS(MPP).
Another equation relating firm-level export sales
with and without MPP funds can be obtained by
noting the respondents’ subjective evaluation of the
proportional change in export sales due to the MPP,
k, is by definition:
(5)   k ' [ES(No MPP)&ES(MPP)] ÷ ES(MPP).
Substituting (3) into (5) then yields 
k '& ∆TS ÷[ e×TS(MPP)],
9  A copy of the application is available from the authors upon request.Jakus, Jensen, and Davis Revenue Impacts of Export Promotion   191
or in terms of equation (2),
(6) k '& {Zγ % σ[λ(No MPP) & λ(MPP)]}
÷{ e×[Xβ%Zγ%λ(MPP)]}.
By exploiting the internal consistency require-
ments implied by equations (2) and (6), the most
efficient model to estimate is a full-information
maximum-likelihood model for equations (2) and
(6). However, the likelihood function must adjust
for complications due to (a) the doubly censored
nature of the total firm sales (TS) data, and (b) firms’
sales (TS) and the proportional change in sales due
to MPP (k) may be distributed according to a bivar-
iate distribution, with correlation between TS and k.
Let the bivariate density of TS and k be repre-
sented by where the scale and correlation φ | 2(TS, k),
parameters are temporarily suppressed. The bivariate
density can be rewritten in terms of its univariate
marginal and conditional densities (Tsokos, 1972):
φ | 2(TS, k) ' φ |(k)×φ |(TS*k).
Introducing the scale and correlation parameters,





and the correlation between the two, respectively,
then the marginal and conditional densities are given
by (7) and (8):



























where f(Xβ, Zγ) is the right-hand side of (6).
The upper (U) and lower (L) limits for the inter-
val variable TS are known. Integrating the condi-
tional density function (8) from !4 to U gives the
conditional probability of being below the upper
limit, Φ(TS<U|k), and integrating from !4 to L
gives the conditional probability of being below the
lower limit, Φ(TS<L|k). The difference between the
two gives the probability of being between the two
limits, conditional on the value of k:
  Φ(L<TS<U*k) '
Φ(TS<U*k) & Φ(TS<L*k).
The likelihood function for the model then becomes
L ' Πi φ | i(k)×Φi(L<TS<U*k),
where i denotes the firm. Note the likelihood func-
tion estimates β, γ, the scale parameters, and the cor-
relation coefficient such that the total impact of MPP
(as implied by k) and the marginal impact of MPP
(as implied by the derivative of TS with respect to
Z) are consistent with each other.
10
Empirical Results from the Linked Model
The “linked” bivariate approach was applied to the
same specifications used for the grouped data mod-
els (table 3).
11 Relative to the grouped data results
reported in table 2, very few of the coefficients in
the linked model changed in either order of magni-
tude or sign. Indeed, only two of the 34 estimates of
X and Z coefficients changed by an order of magni-
tude; only one of these (Small Firm in Model 1) was
statistically significant in the initial grouped data
model. Seven of the 34 X and Z coefficients changed
sign, but none of these parameters were statistically
significant under either estimation method. In short,
the parameter estimates were remarkably stable
across the two modeling approaches. The parameter
stability also suggests that any potential bias associ-
ated with the contingent response is minimal.
Second, the additional information used in the
combined model did achieve the primary goal: more
efficient parameter estimates. Relative to the grouped
data model, the standard errors were smaller for all
coefficients in all specifications of the linked model.
Because we are interested in the impact of MPP
funding on sales, we pay particular attention to the
Z coefficient estimates. Of the 16 potential parame-
ters, nine were significant in the bivariate model,
whereas only six were significant in the grouped
data model. Thus, the linked model which takes ad-
vantage of the additional information on the impact
of MPP allows more precise estimation of the key
parameters.
10  This likelihood function is very similar to that presented in Maddala
(1983, pp. 266S267). The only difference is that Maddala’s first term
adjusts for truncation, a problem not found in our data. It is also similar
to the generalized Tobit models discussed in Amemiya (1985).
11  Due to scaling problems in the maximum-likelihood estimation, the
empirical version of the bivariate model used k×e×TS as the dependent
variable rather than k. This transformation can be achieved by multiplying
both sides of equation (6) by the denominator on the right-hand side.192   October 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3.  Bivariate Models







































































































Log Likelihood !1,267.326 !1,289.449 !1,267.363 !1,267.326
Notes: * and ** denote statistical significance at α = 0.10 and 0.05, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
The additional information used by the bivariate
model provided a more “stable” story regarding the
relationship between MPP Funds and firm sales. In
general, the key variables that were statistically sig-
nificant in one specification were significant in all
specifications. The linear term for MPP Funds was
negative and significant in all models, whereas the
interaction term between MPP Funds and Small
Firm was positive and significant in all models. The
interaction between MPP Funds and New to Export
was never significant.
In the X vector, both the linear and quadratic
terms for the number of employees were statisti-
cally significant in all the models in which these
terms appeared. Years in Business was significant
in the second two models, but not in the first and
last, perhaps because these models also included a
quadratic term for Years in Business.
The linked modeling strategy also provided
parameter estimates for the standard deviation of the
grouped data [Sigma(Total Sales)] and the standard
deviation of the model of respondents’ subjec-
tive evaluations [Sigma(k×e×Total Sales)]. In all
models, these parameter estimates were positive (as
required by statistical theory) and significant. The
correlation parameter, Rho, measures the error
correlation between the two models. A statistically
significant parameter would imply that the omitted
effects of one model (say, the grouped data model)
were correlated with the omitted effects of the other
(the contingent response model). The estimate for
Rho did fall in the [!1,1] interval as required by sta-
tistical theory, but was significant in only one model
(Model 3).Jakus, Jensen, and Davis Revenue Impacts of Export Promotion   193
Marginal and Average Revenue Analysis
As previously noted, one cannot simply look at the
sign of a parameter to predict what would happen to
firm sales as that variable changes (i.e., we did not
state that firm sales were negatively related to MPP
Funds, only that the sign was negative). Instead, the
impact of MPP on firm sales must be calculated for
each firm.
We do this in two ways. First, the marginal effect
of the MPP funding was calculated by evaluating
the derivative of the total sales function at the exact
value of each firm’s characteristics. Thus, this
directly measures the marginal revenue (MR) gener-
ated by the last dollar of MPP funding. Recalling
equation (1), however, this is a “reduced” form of
the marginal effect, capturing the effects of the MPP
allocation as well as possible changes in matching
funds and nonsubsidized promotion expenditures.
Second, an average revenue (AR) measure can be
constructed by comparing the change in total sales,
with and without MPP, to the MPP funds.
12
For any given firm, AR per dollar of MPP funding
was specified as:
[TS(MPP)&TS(No MPP)]/MPP Funds,
where total sales were estimated at the value of the
explanatory variables for each firm. The first term
in the numerator used the actual MPP funding
received by the firm, whereas the second term as-
sumed this funding was zero (i.e., no MPP funds).
All other variables were held constant. The estimated
mean MR and AR measures are reported in table 4.
Because of the statistical superiority of the linked
model, all MR and AR results were calculated using
results from the bivariate model.
Confidence intervals (CIs) were estimated for
both measures using the bootstrap technique devel-
oped by Krinsky and Robb (1986). The Krinsky-
Robb method was used because the measures of
interest—namely, marginal revenue and average
revenue of MPP funding—were nonlinear functions
of random variables (i.e., the maximum-likelihood
estimates). This technique uses information about
the parameter estimates contained in the variance-
covariance matrix to develop an empirical distribu-
tion for the marginal and total effects of MPP.
The Krinsky-Robb approach uses a random draw
from the multivariate normal distribution implied
by the variance-covariance matrix to generate
parameter estimates which are “reasonably likely”
alternatives to the original estimates, given the
standard errors and covariance terms of the esti-
mated variance-covariance matrix. MR and AR are
calculated for each firm at the new parameter vector
implied by a given random draw, and the mean for
the sample calculated. If this is done a sufficiently
large number of times (5,000 in this case), an empir-
ical distribution for the measure of interest can be
generated (i.e., 5,000 estimates of the mean margin-
al effect). After ordering the empirical distribution
from smallest to largest, the 95% confidence interval
can be established by finding the cutoff points for
the top and bottom 2.5%.
The largest MR effects of MPP funding were
produced by estimates from the most restrictive
model (Model 2), with the marginal dollar of MPP
funding being worth, on average, about $7.14 in
additional export sales. The marginal dollar of MPP
funding had an impact of $7.40 in additional export
sales for small firms (with 95% CI between $0.31
and $14.75), whereas MPP had an estimated MR
for large firms of $5.73 (95% CI between $2.28 and
$9.44). The MR estimates for the other model speci-
fications were slightly smaller than those calculated
for Model 2.
For all specifications, the mean and confidence
interval estimates for AR followed the same general
pattern as for the MR measure. The largest AR
estimate for the full sample, $23.81, also came from
Model 2. This finding indicates, on average, every
dollar of MPP funding generated $23.81 in export
sales. The corresponding 95% CI was between $2.01
and $46.22. The mean AR varied by firm size, where
firms with more than 500 employees had an esti-
mated mean AR of $16.81, while smaller firms had
a mean AR of $25.08.
Other specifications yielded smaller estimates of
AR, but followed the same pattern as the first speci-
fication. An important aspect of Models 1, 3, and 4
concerns the confidence intervals. In general, the
95% CI for small firms was much wider than that
for large firms, indicating there was much more
variation in the MPP revenue impacts for small firms
than for large firms. In fact, the CI for small firms
included a negative lower bound for all specifi-
cations except the second. This finding means the
estimated AR for small firms was statistically equal
to zero for all specifications except the second.
In contrast, the 95% CI for large firms was not
only strictly greater than zero, it was strictly greater
than one. This finding shows that large firms gen-
erated more than $1 in export sales for every dollar
12  Recall, by equation (4), the change in total sales due to MPP funding
is equivalent to the change in export sales.194   October 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review













   Overall (n = 150) 6.35 (0.13S12.65) 18.68 (!1.68S38.69)
   Firms with $ 500 employees (n = 23) 5.54 (2.12S9.03) 13.84 (2.32S25.61)
   Firms with < 500 employees (n = 127) 6.50 (!0.46S13.43) 19.55 (!2.42S41.02)
 Model 2:
   Overall (n = 150) 7.14 (0.76S13.80) 23.81 (2.01S46.22)
   Firms with $ 500 employees (n = 23) 5.73 (2.28S9.44) 16.81 (3.77S30.46)
   Firms with < 500 employees (n = 127) 7.40 (0.31S14.75) 25.08 (1.61S49.08)
 Model 3:
   Overall (n = 150) 6.21 (0.43S11.98) 18.28 (!1.29S7.29)
   Firms with $ 500 employees (n = 23) 5.42 (2.14S8.75) 13.51 (2.55S24.66)
   Firms with < 500 employees (n = 127) 6.35 (!0.10S12.75) 19.15 (!2.09S39.83)
 Model 4:
   Overall (n = 150) 6.25 (0.25S12.14) 18.31 (!1.40S37.13)
   Firms with $ 500 employees (n = 23) 5.47 (2.02S8.98) 13.59 (2.50S24.81)
   Firms with < 500 employees (n = 127) 6.39 (!0.37S13.04) 19.17 (!2.01S39.39)
 
a The 95% confidence interval was calculated using the Krinsky-Robb bootstrap technique with 5,000 random draws.
of MPP funding. The size of the confidence inter-
vals is not due to the differing sample sizes for each
group (i.e., 23 large firms and 127 small firms), but
rather to relatively greater variation in the character-
istics of small firms.
13 A referee also noted the rela-
tive inexperience of small firms in exporting may
have resulted in greater variability in the impact of
MPP funds on export sales.
Conclusions
This study has attempted to answer the question of
whether firm size and export experience matter in
the effectiveness of converting MPP funds into
revenues. The results do not support the contention
of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) that
larger, more export-experienced firms were less
effective than small firms in using export promotion
funds to increase firms’ export sales. Regardless of
model specification, MPP funds provided a positive
marginal impact on large firms’ export revenues.
Further, the confidence intervals for both mar-
ginal revenue and average revenue generated by
MPP funding allow us to conclude with great confi-
dence that large firms have a greater than one-to-
one revenue payoff for each dollar of MPP funding.
The same cannot be said of small firms. While it was
true the point estimate of the MPP revenue payoff
for small firms (both MR and AR) was larger than
the corresponding point estimate for large firms, the
confidence interval surrounding these point esti-
mates included the value of zero for three of the four
specifications. Consequently, it cannot be stated with
great confidence that, on average, MPP funding
aided small firms in increasing export sales. Thus,
the recent programmatic change requiring distribu-
tion of all MPP funds to small firms and coopera-
tives (based on the efficiency argument of the GAO)
was not supported by our data.
Furthermore, the fact that the average overall and
small firm effects (except for one model) were
insignificant suggests moving program preferences
toward small firms will make the revenue effects
even more insignificant, on average. Of course, the
reported measures are each the mean of a distribu-
tion, and each distribution has firms in either the left
tail or the right tail of the distribution. This phenom-
enon may help explain, in part, why there is so much
disagreement about whether export promotion is
effective in increasing sales, and for whom.
The relatively large variation in AR for small
firms compared with large firms suggests that other
screening criteria for the Market Access Program,
such as viability of an export marketing plan, may
be more critical for small firms than for large firms
to ensure effective use of the funds. The results also
13  Indeed, the 95% confidence intervals were each based on 5,000 ran-
dom draws, with each draw representing an empirical estimate of the
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point to the importance of calculating confidence
intervals for any measure of program effectiveness,
which is usually not done in the promotion evalua-
tion literature. It should be noted that just reporting
the mean MR and AR effects would have given a
misleading impression of significance when, statis-
tically, most MR and AR estimates for small firms
were not significantly different from zero.
Another GAO hypothesis was that new-to-export
firms (those firms with exporting experience of five
years or less) would use MPP funds more effective-
ly than export-experienced firms to increase export
sales. Based on our analysis, the measure for export
experience was never significant in any model,
indicating inexperienced firms are no more or less
effective than experienced firms in converting MPP
funds into increased export revenues.
We note a few final caveats of the study. First,
this study is a cross-sectional snapshot in time, but
promotion effects can have distributed lag effects.
Hence, the effects as measured in this study would
be expected to underestimate the longer-term effects.
It may be conjectured that these distributed lag
effects would tend to shift the distribution of the
marginal effects and benefit/cost measures toward
more positive values. However, verification of this
conjecture would require time-series firm-level data
of the type used here. To date, these types of data
are not publicly available or collected, making
quantification of firm-level distributed lag effects
infeasible at this point in time.
Second, we have not investigated the potential
for differing revenue effects across different coun-
tries (as discussed in footnote 7). If, for example,
our sample represented firms which exported
disproportionately to countries with relatively low
revenue effects (or relatively high revenue effects),
the econometric model would have reflected these
effects.
Third, our estimate of “marginal” revenue effects
is a reduced form of the revenue effect that includes
possible firm responses such as changing nonsubsi-
dized export expenditures. Fully investigating these
effects would yield a more accurate measure of the
net impact of MPP funding.
Finally, although Congress and other federal
agencies are interested in the sales enhancement
effects of MPP funding, a more theoretically sound
test of the social desirability of the MPP program
would assess the benefits and costs of the program
as measured by changes in consumer and producer
surplus, applying a potential Pareto criterion in the
analysis.
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Appendix: Marginal Effects for Continuous
Variables in Total Sales Equation
Following Maddala (1983, pp. 366S368), let
           
αL ' L & Xβ & Zγ,
αU' U & Xβ & Zγ.
Then define from text footnote 5:

























Answer: Working backwards using rules of calculus:









Working on numerator (N) first:
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vector, not a scalar).      
Next, working on denominator (D):
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Now the model is written from the text as follows:
             TS ' DS % Xβ % Zγ % σλ(X, Z).
Thus, the marginal effect of X on TS is as shown in the
text:
(A10)   
MTS
MX
' β % σ Mλ
MX
' β % β
(αLφ | L& αUφ | U)
σ(ΦU& ΦL)
& λ2 .
The derivation with respect to Z variables would proceed
in a similar fashion.